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Abstract
Our goal is for agents to optimize the right re-
ward function, despite how difficult it is for us
to specify what that is. Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (IRL) enables us to infer reward func-
tions from demonstrations, but it usually assumes
that the expert is noisily optimal. Real people,
on the other hand, often have systematic biases:
risk-aversion, myopia, etc. One option is to try
to characterize these biases and account for them
explicitly during learning. But in the era of deep
learning, a natural suggestion researchers make is
to avoid mathematical models of human behavior
that are fraught with specific assumptions, and
instead use a purely data-driven approach. We
decided to put this to the test – rather than re-
lying on assumptions about which specific bias
the demonstrator has when planning, we instead
learn the demonstrator’s planning algorithm that
they use to generate demonstrations, as a differ-
entiable planner. Our exploration yielded mixed
findings: on the one hand, learning the planner
can lead to better reward inference than relying
on the wrong assumption; on the other hand, this
benefit is dwarfed by the loss we incur by going
from an exact to a differentiable planner. This sug-
gest that at least for the foreseeable future, agents
need a middle ground between the flexibility of
data-driven methods and the useful bias of known
human biases. Code is available at https:
//tinyurl.com/learningbiases.
1. Introduction
Our ultimate goal is to enable the design of agents that opti-
mize for the right reward function. Unfortunately, designing
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Figure 1. While we could correct for systematic biases by having
our AI system reason about explicit models of human reasoning,
using the wrong assumption can lead to agents that do not correctly
understand what people want. A natural alternative is to learn
human biases from data. Our goal in this work is to investigate this
alternative and gain insight into what additional assumptions might
make it feasible and what algorithmic improvements it demands.
reward functions is challenging (Amodei et al., 2017) and
can have unintended side-effects (Hadfield-Menell et al.,
2017; Krakovna, 2018). Inverse Reinforcement Learning
(IRL) (Russell, 1998; Ng et al., 2000; Abbeel & Ng, 2004)
aims to bypass the need for reward design by learning the
reward from observed demonstrations of good behavior.
Existing IRL algorithms typically make the assumption that
the demonstrator is either optimal, or Boltzmann rational,
i.e. taking better actions with higher probability (Ziebart
et al., 2008; Finn et al., 2016). However, there is a rich
literature showing that humans are not optimal, and are
biased in systematic ways. Consider a grad student who
starts writing a paper a month in advance, expecting it to
take two weeks, but then misses the deadline. Should we
infer that they prefer to lose sleep to pursue a deadline that
they then miss? Of course not. This is a classic case of
the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 1994): the grad student
was wrong in their prediction of how long it would take
to complete the paper. An assumption of noisy rationality
cannot allow us to correct for this bias: how do we tell
whether the grad student underestimated the time required
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and actually wanted to finish the paper earlier, rather than
overestimating the time required and actually wanting to
finish the paper even later?
Of course, if we know that humans tend to underestimate
how long any given task will take, then we can correct for
this bias by having our AI system reason about how it affects
human reasoning, as illustrated in figure 1a. IRL algorithms
have been developed that can account for particular system-
atic biases, such as myopia and hyperbolic time discounting
(Evans et al., 2016; Evans & Goodman, 2015), sparse noise
(Zheng et al., 2014), risk sensitivity (Majumdar et al., 2017),
or a bad dynamics model (Reddy et al., 2018). Even sub-
optimal trajectories or failures (Shiarlis et al., 2016) can be
thought of as a biased demonstrator, where the bias is the
specific model of failure. However, choosing a particular
model of suboptimality is a big assumption, and can lead to
arbitrarily bad performance if the assumption is incorrect
(Steinhardt, 2017; Steinhardt & Evans, 2017). For example,
if we try to explain the grad student’s behavior as hyperbolic
time discounting (that is, valuing short-term rewards dis-
proportionately more than long-term ones), we might infer
that the grad student enjoys long nights of writing over the
short term, rather than viewing it as an instrumental goal
necessary for submitting the paper. We wouldn’t want our
AI system deleting our in-progress paper so that we can
have the “joy” of rewriting it from scratch!
Given how complex real humans are, it seems hopeless to
know exactly which bias a person is displaying, and in-
evitable that any such assumption will lead to a misspecified
bias model. In the age of data-driven methods, it seems
almost natural to think that we could learn the bias model as
well, rather than relying on a hardcoded assumption. One
can view the demonstrator’s behavior as a composition of
a reward function and a planning algorithm that computes
what actions to take given a reward function – instead of
assuming a planning algorithm (e.g. noisy rational, myopic,
etc.), why not learn it? Our work is about exploring the
feasibility of this alternative (depicted in figure 1b).
Right off the bat, this enticing and seemingly natural idea
hits a wall: unfortunately, when the planning algorithm can
be any function mapping reward functions to policies, it
is impossible to learn the true reward function even with
infinite data, because there are always alternative explana-
tions for the observed policy (Armstrong & Mindermann,
2018; Christiano, 2015). Any particular behavior could be
explained either by positing a term in the reward function,
or a bias in the planning algorithm. Rather than using data
to avoid all assumptions, our work actually investigates
whether it is at least feasible to learn the planning algorithm
when either a) we get to first observe demonstrations in tasks
where we know the reward, and can thus focus only on learn-
ing the planner for those demonstrations; or b) we assume
that the demonstrator is good at the tasks, and regularize the
planning algorithm towards optimality.
We find that even in the “easy” setting where we are given
access to some rewards, this problem is very difficult: there
is some benefit from learning systematic biases in the plan-
ner, but this is dwarfed by the disadvantage of using a neural
network as a planner, relative to using an exact, perhaps
slightly misspecified model of rationality. In the case where
we instead regularize towards optimality, the resulting algo-
rithm is more robust to different human models, but again
the benefit is dwarfed by the inaccuracies introduced by
differentiable planning.
2. Examples of Biases
To put this work in context, we start with some examples
of the kind of biases a general algorithm should be able to
capture and account for. While we use these for illustrative
purposes, the whole point of our exploration is that humans
might have systematic suboptimalities completely different
from these examples. We don’t know all the possible biases
a priori – if we did, using that information would certainly
be the superior choice.
Running Example. We illustrate the effects of these bi-
ases on a simple 2D navigation task in figure 2. There are
multiple salient locations, each of which has a desirability
score (which can be negative, in which case the agent wants
to avoid those locations). The agent can move in any of
the four cardinal directions, or stay in its current position.
Every movement action has a chance of failing and caus-
ing the agent to move in a direction orthogonal to the one
it chose. Despite their simplicity, there are several ways
in which human-like suboptimal behavior can manifest in
these environments.
Time inconsistency. Would you prefer to get $100 in 30
days, or $110 in 31 days? Faced with this question, peo-
ple typically choose the latter. However, thirty days later,
when faced with the choice of getting $100 now, or $110
tomorrow, they sometimes choose to take the $100. This re-
versal of preferences over time would never happen with an
optimal agent that maximizes expected sum of discounted
rewards. Researchers model this phenomenon using hy-
perbolic time discounting, in which future rewards are dis-
counted more aggressively than exponentially. This leads to
a followup question – how do humans make long-term plans,
given that their future self will have different preferences?
Prior work has considered a spectrum from naive agents
that assume their future self will have the same preferences
as they do, to sophisticated agents that perfectly understand
how their preferences will change over time and make plans
that take such change into account (Frederick et al., 2002).
In figure 2, when going to a high reward, both the naive and
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Figure 2. The plans of our synthetic agents on two navigation environments. Actual trajectories could differ due to randomness in the
transitions. Green squares indicate positive reward while red squares indicate negative reward, with darker colors indicating higher
magnitude of reward.
sophisticated hyperbolic time discounters can be "tempted"
by a proximate smaller reward. The naive agent fails to an-
ticipate the temptation, and so once it gets near the smaller
positive reward, it caves in to the temptation and stays there.
The sophisticated agent explicitly plans to avoid the tempta-
tion – it does not collect the smaller reward and instead takes
a longer, more dangerous path around the smaller reward to
get to the large reward.
Incorrect estimates of probabilities. Humans are notori-
ously bad at judging probabilities. The availability heuristic
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) refers to the human tendency
to rate events as more likely if they are easier to recall. The
recency effect is a similar effect where recent events are
judged to be more probable. These biases are depend heav-
ily enough on context that they don’t transfer to our task in
any obvious way. So, we use two simplified models – an
overconfident agent, which expects that the most likely next
state is more likely than it actually is, leading it to take what
we would call risky behavior, and an underconfident agent,
which analogously behaves in an overly cautious manner.
In figure 2, the overconfident agent takes the shortest path
to the reward, underestimating the risk of slipping into the
large region of negative reward, while the underconfident
agent plans a circuitous route around negative reward that it
is unlikely to have actually encountered.
Bounded computation. Researchers have studied models
of bounded rationality, where humans are assumed to be
rational subject to the constraint that they have a bounded
amount of computation. This can be thought of as an ex-
planation that many other heuristics and biases are actually
computational shortcuts that allow us to reach reasonably
good decisions without too much cost (Kahneman, 2003).
In our task, we model computation bounds as a small time
horizon for planning, leading to myopic behavior. In fig-
ure 2, the myopic agent can only see close rewards, and
goes directly to them, never even realizing the possibility of
going to the highest reward.
3. Problem: Learning Rewards of
Demonstrators with Unknown Biases
Notation. A (finite-horizon) Markov Decision Process
(MDP) (Puterman, 2014) is a tuple 〈S,A, T, r,H〉. S is a set
of states. A is a set of actions. T is a probability distribution
over the next state, given the previous state and action. We
write this as T (st+1|st, a). r is a reward function that maps
states and actions to rewards r : S×A→ R. H ∈ Z+ is the
finite planning horizon for the agent. Since we are interested
in the setting where the reward function r is unknown, we
will factor MDPs into world models w = 〈S,A, T,H〉 and
reward functions r.
Instead of having access to a reward function, we observe the
behavior of a demonstrator, who performs the task well but
could be suboptimal in systematic ways. We assume that the
demonstrator produces (possibly stochastic) policies using a
planning algorithm D : (W×R)→ (S → A→ [0, 1]), or
planner for short. Here W is a space of world models with
the same set of states S and actionsA, andR ⊆ S×A→ R
is a space of reward functions that the demonstrator can plan
for. Later in this section we illustrate additional assumptions
about D. We observe the demonstrator’s policy pi : S → A
for a particular world model w, with piD = D(w, r∗) for
some unknown reward r∗.
Estimating Biases and Rewards. Given a world model w
and the demonstrator’s policy piD which may exhibit an un-
known bias, determine the reward r∗ that the demonstrator
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is optimizing.
We might hope that enough data can solve this problem
without any additional assumptions. However, this problem
is unsolvable – Armstrong & Mindermann (2018) prove an
impossibility result showing that for any potential reward
function r′, there is some planner D′ such that D′(w, r′) =
D(w, r∗). The proof is simple – simply setD′(w, r′) = piD
for any r′, that is D′ always returns piD regardless of the
reward function. What we really explore in this work is
thus data-driven approaches that make minimal additional
assumptions, rather than none at all.
Inverse reinforcement learning assumes that the demonstra-
tor is (approximately) optimal to get around this issue. It is
common to assume Boltzmann rationality, where the prob-
ability of an action is proportional to the exponent of its
expected value (Baker et al., 2006), i.e. P (a|s) ∝ eQ(s,a),
where Q is the optimal Q function that satisfies the Bellman
equation:
Q(s, a) = r(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
[
T (s′|s, a) max
a′
Q(s′, a′)
]
(1)
However, we know that humans are systematically subop-
timal, and so we would like to relax this assumption and
try other, more realistic assumptions. The pathological
solutions in the impossibility result occur partly because
the demonstrator can have arbitrary behavior on different
environments. While we certainly want the demonstrator
to adapt to different environments, the algorithm that the
demonstrator uses to determine their policy should stay fixed
across similar environments. This imposes structure on the
demonstrator’s planner that can eliminate some possibilities.
Assumption 1: The demonstrator plans in the same way for
sufficiently similar environments.
Intuitively, the demonstrator’s planning algorithm D :
(W × R) → (S → A → [0, 1]) is “the same” for sim-
ilar environments. Of course, if D can be any function
with this type signature, it can still map any arbitrary (w, r)
pair to any arbitrary policy D(w, r), but we will further
ensure that D is simple (through regularization). Given a
list of world models W = [w1 . . . wn] and reward functions
R = [r1 . . . rn], we define D(W,R) to be the list of the
demonstrator’s policies [D(w1, r1) . . . D(wn, rn)].
Note that this is a strong assumption: while it is reasonable
to believe that people plan in the same way for variations of
the same task, they likely have different biases for different
tasks, because they may have domain-specific heuristics.
The setting of multiple tasks has been studied before (Gleave
& Habryka, 2018; Dimitrakakis & Rothkopf, 2011; Choi &
Kim, 2012; Xu et al., 2018), though not for the purpose of
inferring systematic biases.
This assumption leads to a slightly easier problem, of recov-
ering rewards from multiple tasks:
Estimating Biases and Rewards for Multiple Tasks.
Given a list of world models W and the demonstrator’s
policies ΠD = D(W,R) which may exhibit an unknown
bias, determine the list of reward functions R (one for each
w ∈W ) that the demonstrator was optimizing.
Since the person uses the same planner across all tasks, an
agent can have an easier time recovering rewards for each
task by leveraging the common structure across the tasks.
This is especially appealing for agents that would get to
observe people for some period of time before trying to
assist them. However, Assumption 1 still falls prey to the
impossibility result. Consider the case where the demonstra-
tor is optimal. Given the assumptions so far, we could infer
that the demonstrator is minimizing expected reward for the
reward function −r∗, since that perfectly predicts piD. This
is very bad, as we could infer a reward that incentivizes the
worst possible behavior!
When humans take action, we typically assume that they are
doing something that is reasonable for achieving their goals,
even if it is not optimal:
Assumption 2a: The demonstrator is “close” to optimal.
This is a weaker version of the standard IRL assumption of
Boltzmann rationality. In section 4.3, we derive a natural
algorithm that takes advantage of this assumption, by reg-
ularizing the planner towards optimality. This gives us an
algorithm for the problem of estimating biases and rewards
for multiple tasks that does not obviously fail due to an
impossibility result.
We also explore an alternative approach, based on the fact
that we have strong priors about what humans are trying to
optimize for. Intuitively, these priors allow us to infer how
good they are at achieving their goals, and in what ways they
are systematically biased, which can be used to better infer
goals in new settings. We formalize this by assuming that
we observe some tasks where we know the demonstrator’s
reward function and policy.
This again gives us a natural algorithm, detailed in sec-
tion 4.2 that does not obviously fail due to the impossibility
result, since we can easily infer that the demonstrator is
“close” to optimal from the tasks for which we do observe
the demonstrator’s reward function.
Assumption 2b: We know what reward function the demon-
strator is optimizing for some tasks.
Estimating Biases and Rewards with Access to Tasks
with Known Rewards. Given a list of world models W , a
list of the demonstrator’s policies ΠD = D(W,R), a list of
world models Wknown with known rewards Rknown and a list
of the demonstrator’s policies Πknown = D(Wknown, Rknown),
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determine the reward functions R that D was optimizing.
While our problem formulations above assume that we have
access to full policies ΠD, none of the algorithms rely on
this assumption – it is easy to modify them to work with
trajectories instead.
4. Algorithms to Estimate Biases and
Rewards
The idea that we investigate in this work is whether it is
beneficial to learn a model of how the demonstrator plans.
Once we have learned the planning algorithm D, we are
faced with an inverse problem: we want to find the r such
that piD = D(w, r). This resembles the problem of fea-
ture visualization for image classifiers (Olah et al., 2017),
and suggests a natural approach: as long as the planner D
is differentiable, we can invert its “understanding” using
backpropagation to infer the reward from the policy.
4.1. Architecture
We model the demonstrator planning algorithm D using
a differentiable planner fθ, which is a neural net that can
express planning algorithms whose parameters θ can be
updated using gradient descent. f has the same type as
the demonstrator’s planner D, namely (W× R)→ (S →
A→ [0, 1]). Thus, the inputs to the differentiable planner
f are a world model w ∈W and a reward function r ∈ R;
the output is a stochastic policy pi ∈ (S → A → [0, 1]).
We determine how well 〈f,R〉 matches the demonstrator’s
policy piD with the cross entropy loss L(fθ(W,R),ΠD) =∑
i
L(fθ(wi, ri), piD,i).
While the algorithms can work with any differentiable plan-
ner, in this work we use a value iteration network (VIN)
(Tamar et al., 2016). A VIN is a fully differentiable neu-
ral network that embeds an approximate value iteration
algorithm inside a feed-forward classification network. For
environments where transitions only depend on "nearby"
states (as in navigation tasks), the Bellman update can be
performed using an appropriate convolution, and the com-
putation of values from Q-values can be done with a max-
pooling layer. By leaving the filters for the convolutions
unspecified, the VIN can automatically learn the transition
probabilities. Of course, the VIN is merely one architecture
for a differentiable planner; we could equally well use other
planners (Srinivas et al., 2018; Pascanu et al., 2017; Guez
et al., 2018). The algorithms we study will become stronger
as research in this area advances.
The components of the algorithms. This architecture en-
ables two main operations that are important for inferring
rewards and biases, which we illustrate in figure 3. First,
given world models W , reward functions R (either known
or hypothesized), and the demonstrator’s policies ΠD, we
can train a corresponding planner using gradient descent
(figure 3a):
θ = min
θ′
L(fθ′(W,R),ΠD) (TRAIN-PLANNER)
Second, given world models W , demonstrator’s policies
ΠD, and some planner parameters θ, we can infer the cor-
responding reward functions using gradient descent (fig-
ure 3b):
R = min
R′
L(fθ(W,R′),ΠD) (TRAIN-REWARD)
It is also possible to perform both of these at the same time
by training the planner parameters and rewards jointly given
world models W and the demonstrator’s policies ΠD:
R, θ = min
R′,θ′
L(fθ′(W,R′),ΠD) (TRAIN-JOINTLY)
4.2. Learning the planner from known rewards first
(Assumption 2b)
Consider the simpler setting when we have access to a set of
tasks with known rewards. The known rewards can be used
to infer the planning algorithm used by the demonstrator,
which can then be used to infer rewards in the remaining
cases. So, the planner is first trained on the world models
for which we have rewards. Then, learned planner weights
allow us to infer the reward on the world models for which
we don’t know the reward. This algorithm is illustrated in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 IRL-WITH-REWARDS: Estimating biases and
rewards with access to tasks with known rewards. Requires
that Assumptions 1 and 2b hold.
1: θ ⇐ TRAIN-PLANNER(Wknown, Rknown,Πknown)
2: return TRAIN-REWARD(W, θ,ΠD)
4.3. Learning the planner and rewards simultaneously
(Assumption 2a)
Perhaps the most natural algorithm to solve our problem
would be to jointly train the planner and rewards on the given
set of world models and policies. However, this falls prey
to the impossibility result: there is no way to distinguish
between reward maximization with an optimal reward r∗
and reward minimization with the reward −r∗. So, it would
be useful to regularize the planner so that it is “close” to
optimal, in accordance with Assumption 2a.
A natural way to do this regularization is by initializing
the planner to be optimal, and then finetuning the result by
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(a) Training the planner fθ . We hold the world model w, reward
r, and policy pi fixed, and update fθ with gradient descent.
(b) Training the rewardR. We hold the world modelw, planner fθ ,
and policy pi fixed, and update the reward r with gradient descent.
Figure 3. The architecture and operations on it used in the algorithms.
training jointly as in Equation TRAIN-JOINTLY. Since the
reward inference requires a differentiable planner, we need a
method that sets a differentiable planner to be optimal (that
is, the planner that maximizes expected reward). This can
be done by simulating data from an optimal agent with ran-
domly generated world models and rewards, and use this to
train the planner to mimic an optimal agent. The resulting al-
gorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 2. We show in section 5.4
that the initialization is crucial for good performance as we
would expect.
Algorithm 2 IRL-WITHOUT-REWARDS: Estimating biases
and rewards for multiple tasks with no known rewards. Re-
quires that Assumptions 1 and 2a hold.
1: Wsim, Rsim ⇐ Generate world models and rewards
2: Πsim ⇐ Run optimal agent on 〈Wsim, Rsim〉
3: θinit ⇐ TRAIN-PLANNER(Wsim, Rsim,Πsim)
4: Rinit ⇐ TRAIN-REWARD(W, θinit,ΠD)
5: θ,R⇐ TRAIN-JOINTLY(W,ΠD) {using θinit and Rinit
as initializations}
6: return R
5. Evaluation
We evaluate the algorithms by simulating demonstrators
with different biases, and testing whether the same method
can correctly infer reward for all these demonstrators.
5.1. Experiment details
In all experiments below, results are averaged over 10 runs
with different seeds, on randomly generated 14x14 grid-
worlds that have 7 squares with non-zero rewards. We
ensure that all such squares can be reached from the start
state, and that at least half of the positions in grid are not
walls.
We use a Value Iteration Network with 10 iterations as the
differentiable planner, and set the space of rewards to be
S → R; that is, any state can be mapped to any reward,
but the reward is assumed not to depend on the action. We
added an extra convolutional layer to the initial part of the
VIN (which learns a proxy reward) as initial experiments
showed that this could better learn an optimal planner for
our gridworlds; other than that the architecture remains as
described in Tamar et al. (2016). We apply L2 regularization
to the VIN with scale 0.0001, and do not regularize the
reward.
For all experiments, we kept the number of demonstrations
fixed to 8000. For Algorithm 1, this was split into 7000
policies with rewards that were used to train the planner,
and 1000 on which rewards had to be inferred. Note that
this does not include any simulated data – for example,
Algorithm 2 would get 8000 biased policies, and would also
simulate a further 7000 policies from an optimal agent in
order to initialize the planner and reward.
5.2. Evaluating reward inference
Hypothesis. The hypothesis we put to the test in this work
is that accounting for unknown systematic bias should out-
perform the assumption of a particular inaccurate bias, e.g.
noisy rationality or the lack thereof.
Manipulated variables. In order to test this, we manipu-
late whether we learn the demonstrator model or assume
it. To avoid confounds introduced by changing the infer-
ence algorithm, we use the same algorithm for both. In
the learning case, we train the planner on the ground truth
demonstrator data; in the assume case, we train it on data
generated from a) a Boltzmann-rational demonstrator; and
b) an optimal demonstrator – these are the two models com-
monly assumed by IRL algorithms. Keeping the algorithm
the same enables us to isolate the effect of adapting to an
unknown model from the effect of having to use an approx-
imate differentiable planner rather than a perfect one. We
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Figure 4. Reward obtained when planning with the inferred reward, as a percentage of the maximum possible reward, for different bias
models and algorithms. We implement five types of biases by modifying the value iteration algorithm to produce a different set of
Q-values. The top row shows results for agents that choose between the best actions from these Q-values, while in the bottom row the
agent chooses actions with probability proportional to the exponent of the Q-value (the Boltzmann assumption). The average over both
rows is displayed in the top left.
will quantify the second effect, i.e. the approximation error
introduced by the VIN, in section 5.3.
In the setting where we learn the bias, we further manipulate
whether we have access to known rewards for some tasks or
not – i.e. whether we use Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2.
Finally, we manipulate the actual bias of the demonstrator.
Following Evans et al. (2016), we implement the myopic,
naive and sophisticated synthetic demonstrators as modi-
fications of the value iteration algorithm. Similarly, we
implement the overconfident and underconfident demonstra-
tors by modifying the transition probability distributions
used to plan in value iteration. We also include an optimal
demonstrator, and stochastic (Boltzmann) versions of all
demonstrators.
Dependent measures. We measure the reward obtained by
planning optimally with the inferred reward function, as a
percentage of the maximum possible reward that could be
obtained.
Comparisons among differentiable planners. Figure 4
shows the results for learning a demonstrator model vs. as-
suming an optimal or a Boltzmann demonstrator. The top
left subfigure plots what happens on average, across all
synthetic demonstrators we tested. The results do provide
support to the hypothesis: both learning methods (orange)
outperform assuming a model (gray). Looking at the break-
down per demonstrator, we see that assuming optimal does
not do well when the demonstrator has any noise (bottom
graph). Similarly, assuming Boltzmann does not do well
when the demonstrator is not noisy (top graph).
The learning methods tend to perform on par with the best
of two choices. In some cases, like the naive and sophis-
ticated hyperbolic discounters, especially the noisy ones,
the learning methods outperform both optimal and Boltz-
mann assumptions. The optimal assumption outperforms
the learning methods in some of the non-noisy cases. We
hypothesize that this is because as long as the demonstra-
tor eventually reaches the best reward location, assuming
optimality allows us to figure out this location. It is then pos-
sible to perform near-optimally on our task with knowledge
of the best reward location, by navigating to that location
and staying there.
Interestingly, Algorithm 1 does not always outperform Al-
gorithm 2, despite it having access to known rewards. We
believe this has to do with the fact that Algorithm 2 exploits
Assumption 2a (demonstrator close to optimal) and initial-
izes from training on simulated optimal demonstrator data.
Algorithm 1 does not rely on this assumption and therefore
does not benefit from this initialization, even though the
assumption is correct for most of the models we test.
5.3. Tradeoff between being adaptive to bias vs. using
exact planning
Our paper is about investigating the viability of the "don’t as-
sume specific biases" idea. To be adaptive to different kinds
of biases the agent might see, it has to learn a model of the
demonstrator’s planning algorithm via a differentiable plan-
ner. Unfortunately, this causes planning to be approximate
– it seems like whatever benefit we get from the adapting
to biases, we lose because of the approximation. But these
planners will become more practical, they can make this
idea practical as well.
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Figure 5. Percent reward obtained for different bias models using variations of Algorithm 2, which does not get access to any known
rewards. These algorithms can vary along two dimensions – whether they are initialized with the assumption that the demonstrator is
rational, and whether they train the planner and reward jointly or with coordinate ascent. The original version of Algorithm 2 does
initialize, and trains jointly.
To quantify this loss, we replace the VIN with a differen-
tiable exact model of the demonstrator, and infer the reward
by backpropagating through the exact model. Since value
iteration is not differentiable, we implement soft value iter-
ation, where max operations are replaced with logsumexp
operations, and measure percent reward obtained when in-
ferring rewards for an optimal demonstrator.
Results. With an exact model of the demonstrator, we get
(98.1 ± 0.1)% of the maximum reward when performing
optimal planning on the inferred rewards, while we get
(86.9 ± 1.6)% with Algorithm 1 and (86.2 ± 1.6)% with
Algorithm 2. Again, better planners would improve both
algorithms.
5.4. How important are the various parts of the
algorithm?
Algorithm 2 was predicated on Assumption 2a, that the
demonstrator’s planner was "close" to rational, which mo-
tivated the initialization step where the planner is trained
to mimic an optimal agent. We test how important this is
by modifying Algorithm 2 to infer rewards without an ini-
tialization (removing lines 1-4). We include versions of the
algorithm where we perform coordinate ascent by alternat-
ing planner training and reward training instead of training
the planner and reward jointly.
Results. Figure 5 shows the results for a subset of demon-
strators (full results are in the supplementary material). We
can see that the initialization is indeed crucial for good
performance, as expected. It also turns out that the joint
training outperforms coordinate ascent.
The importance of joint training. We may also ask what
value the joint training adds over the initialization. Without
the joint training, Algorithm 2 is simply training the planner
to be optimal and then inferring rewards, and so is identical
to the Optimal case in Figure 4. We can see that the joint
training does add value over the initialization.
6. Discussion
Summary. It seems daunting to try to characterize human
biases, and yet assuming the wrong bias can lead to agents
that do not correctly understand what people want. A nat-
ural alternative is to let the data characterize the bias: to
learn how people generate their actions given what they
want, with all the biases they might have. Our goal in this
work was to investigate this approach and gain insight into
whether it just works right off the bat, and, if not, what
additional structure it benefits from and what improvements
in state of the art algorithms it requires. Overall, we have
found that it might be possible to maintain flexibility in
learning systematic biases while regularizing the learned
planner to be close to optimal; but also that for this to be
practical within a deep learning architecture will need more
progress in differentiable planning.
Limitations and future work. A core limitation of our
analysis is that it was conducted on simple problems in
simulation, rather than on real problems with real people.
This makes sense as a starting point, because it allows us
to have ground truth to evaluate against, and allows us to
generate large datasets that would be hard to collect with
real humans. However, as differentiable planners are able to
handle higher complexity, the analysis ought to eventually
move to more realistic tasks with human data.
Further, we did not explore all possible assumptions that
could simplify the planner learning task. The assumption
that the demonstrator has the same bias across many tasks is
key to the algorithms, but is very strong. This analysis could
be extended by using meta-learning to learn a prior over
planners, and by inferring the demonstrator’s beliefs as in
Baker & Tenenbaum (2014) (e.g. via TOMNets (Rabinowitz
et al., 2018)). We are excited to look into this, and into what
additional inductive bias we could leverage, in our future
work.
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A. Additional experimental data
In section 5, we presented data on the results of running
various algorithms against a set of demonstrators, reporting
the reward obtained according to the true reward function
when using the inferred reward with an optimal planner, as
a percentage of the maximum possible true reward. Table 1
shows the percentage reward obtained for all combinations
of algorithms and demonstrators. We also measure the
accuracy of the planner and reward at predicting the demon-
strator’s actions in new gridworlds where the rewards are
the same but the wall locations have changed. These results
are presented in Table 2. Note that there are often multiple
optimal actions at a given state, which makes it challenging
to get high accuracy.
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Table 1. Percent reward obtained when the algorithm (column) is used to infer the bias of the demonstrator (row). The optimal and
Boltzmann algorithms assume a fixed model of the demonstrator and train the VIN to mimic the model before performing reward inference
(and were used in figure 4). We also include the four flavors of Algorithm 2 that were plotted in figure 5. The VI algorithm uses a
differentiable implementation of soft value iteration as the planner instead of a VIN (used in section 5.3). The demonstrators are the
optimal agent, the biased agents of figure 2, and versions of each of these agents with Boltzmann noise.
Agent Optimal Boltzmann Algorithm 1 Coord w/ init Joint w/ init Coord w/o init Joint w/o init VI
Average 67.0± 2.7 79.7± 0.8 89.5± 0.7 85.0± 0.5 86.4± 0.6 −3.9± 0.7 2.6± 1.0 71.9± 3.0
Optimal 87.3± 1.0 73.9± 2.3 86.9± 1.6 86.2± 1.6 88.5± 1.1 −4.2± 1.2 2.6± 3.7 98.1± 0.1
Naive 86.4± 0.9 74.4± 1.6 91.1± 0.8 84.6± 1.2 87.5± 0.9 −3.2± 1.3 2.6± 3.7 96.1± 0.1
Sophisticated 87.5± 1.1 77.1± 1.6 91.8± 1.3 83.6± 1.3 87.9± 1.0 −3.6± 1.4 2.6± 3.7 96.7± 0.1
Myopic 82.8± 0.8 77.0± 1.2 81.0± 2.8 80.6± 0.8 82.6± 1.0 −5.5± 2.8 2.6± 3.7 87.5± 0.2
Overconfident 87.5± 1.2 70.7± 1.7 82.1± 1.4 83.9± 1.5 86.7± 1.2 −2.7± 1.1 2.6± 3.7 97.5± 0.1
Underconfident 88.0± 0.8 74.7± 1.6 86.7± 1.2 86.1± 1.5 88.5± 1.0 −2.4± 1.4 2.6± 3.7 98.9± 0.2
Boltzmann 8.5± 1.0 90.7± 1.3 91.4± 0.8 88.4± 1.6 91.3± 0.9 −3.0± 1.9 2.6± 3.7 8.7± 0.1
B-Naive 52.8± 2.3 77.3± 2.9 98.5± 0.1 82.5± 2.4 75.8± 2.9 −8.3± 4.5 2.6± 3.7 47.7± 0.2
B-Sophisticated 51.5± 2.1 74.5± 2.8 98.8± 0.2 80.1± 1.5 77.0± 2.3 −8.7± 3.9 2.6± 3.7 48.0± 0.2
B-Myopic 77.7± 1.1 90.8± 0.6 95.6± 1.0 91.5± 0.6 91.9± 0.5 −2.4± 2.1 2.6± 3.7 83.4± 0.1
B-Overconfident 7.0± 0.9 84.1± 2.3 79.2± 2.3 81.4± 2.8 86.3± 1.3 −0.8± 1.6 2.6± 3.7 8.7± 0.1
B-Underconfident 86.7± 0.9 91.3± 0.7 91.2± 0.7 90.7± 1.0 92.4± 0.8 −1.8± 1.2 2.6± 3.7 92.1± 0.1
Table 2. Accuracy when predicting the demonstrator’s actions (row) on new gridworlds using the planner and reward inferred by the
algorithm (column). Algorithms and demonstrators are the same as in Table 1.
Agent Optimal Boltzmann Algorithm 1 Coord w/ init Joint w/ init Coord w/o init Joint w/o init VI
Optimal 61.3± 0.4 59.8± 0.4 62.0± 0.3 62.8± 0.2 63.6± 0.3 63.0± 0.2 72.4± 0.1 25.7± 0.1
Naive 60.1± 0.3 59.4± 0.3 58.6± 0.3 61.3± 0.3 61.8± 0.3 61.0± 0.3 71.1± 0.1 24.9± 0.1
Sophisticated 60.5± 0.4 59.2± 0.4 59.3± 0.3 61.0± 0.3 62.0± 0.4 61.2± 0.3 71.2± 0.1 24.9± 0.1
Myopic 54.1± 0.4 53.5± 0.5 54.9± 0.5 55.6± 0.2 56.1± 0.3 56.0± 0.1 62.8± 0.1 20.4± 0.1
Overconfident 61.6± 0.4 60.1± 0.4 61.8± 0.4 63.3± 0.3 63.7± 0.3 63.1± 0.2 72.8± 0.1 25.9± 0.1
Underconfident 60.9± 0.4 59.5± 0.4 61.4± 0.3 62.4± 0.3 62.9± 0.3 62.5± 0.3 72.0± 0.1 25.5± 0.1
Boltzmann 56.7± 1.1 60.5± 0.4 60.9± 0.3 60.3± 0.2 60.8± 0.3 62.3± 0.3 67.1± 0.5 24.2± 0.1
B-Naive 56.6± 0.8 59.8± 0.8 60.4± 0.1 60.3± 0.2 60.5± 0.7 59.9± 0.3 68.5± 0.3 23.7± 0.1
B-Sophisticated 57.6± 0.7 60.2± 0.7 60.5± 0.2 60.5± 0.2 61.2± 0.3 60.1± 0.3 68.5± 0.3 23.7± 0.1
B-Myopic 56.3± 0.2 56.9± 0.4 55.9± 0.2 56.5± 0.2 57.0± 0.2 56.3± 0.1 62.4± 0.1 20.3± 0.0
B-Overconfident 56.9± 1.1 60.7± 0.4 61.3± 0.3 60.9± 0.2 61.6± 0.3 62.7± 0.2 68.0± 0.5 24.2± 0.1
B-Underconfident 62.4± 0.3 63.1± 0.4 63.4± 0.2 63.0± 0.1 63.6± 0.1 63.5± 0.2 72.2± 0.1 25.4± 0.1
